1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
789	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE	
10	RAOUL MEILLEUR,	CASE NO. C11-1025MJP
11	Plaintiff,	ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
12	v.	DISMISS
13	AT&T CORP., and DOES 1 through 20,	
14	Defendants.	
15		
16	This matter comes before the Court on Defendant AT&T Corp.'s motion to dismiss	
17	Plaintiff's claim entitled Count B. (Dkt. No. 43.) Having reviewed the motion, the response	
18	(Dkt. No. 47), the reply (Dkt. No. 50), and all related papers, the Court DENIES the motion.	
19	Background	
20	In Count B of his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that "[o]n information and belief, Plaintiff	
21	Meilleur received two or more telemarketing or solicitation calls from Defendant within a	
22	twelve-month period, including the call received on January 6, 2010, and one or more other calls	
23	within the preceding twelve months." (Dkt. No. 42 ¶ 2.5.) These allegations are intended to	
24	sustain Plaintiff's claim brought under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") for	

violations of the "do-not-call" regulations set out in 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2). The TCPA permits such a claim by any "person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity. . . ." 47 U.S.C.§ 227(c)(5). The Court initially dismissed Plaintiff's "do-not-call" claim because he had not alleged any facts that he had received two or more calls in a twelve month period. Plaintiff has amended his complaint with the above allegations, which AT&T argues continue to be inadequate.

Analysis

The motion to dismiss presents the question of whether Plaintiff's factual allegations preceded by the caveat "on information and belief" satisfy Rule 8(a) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The Court holds they do.

A recent Ninth Circuit opinion suggests that there is nothing inherently wrong with Plaintiff's allegations, which "need only allege facts with sufficient specificity to notify defendants of plaintiffs' claims." See Balderas v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., No. 10-55064, ____ F.3d ____, 2011 WL 6824977, at *3 (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 2011). In Balderas, the court held that allegations the plaintiffs had received a defective notice in violation of the Truth In Lending Act "on or about March 23, 2009," was sufficient to state a claim even where the delivery date was critical to the claim's validity. Id. The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient factual allegations as to the date of delivery, even if not with one-hundred percent accuracy, to allow the claim to go forward and be tested on the merits. Id. at *4. The Court reaffirmed the notion that "so long as the plaintiff alleges facts to support a theory that is not facially implausible, the court's skepticism is best reserved for later stages of the proceedings when the plaintiff's case can be rejected on evidentiary grounds." Id. (quoting In re Gilead Sci. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008)).

1 Plaintiff has presented sufficient factual allegations to survive dismissal on Count B of 2 his amended complaint. He has alleged with specificity the date of one call and that "on 3 information and belief," he received another within twelve months. That he cannot remember with specificity the date on which the second call occurred is not fatal. He has alleged that he 5 received two or more calls in a twelve month period, and the fact that he does not remember the 6 precise date does not mean that his claim is implausible or that it does not put Defendants on notice of his claim. Just as the court in Balderas accepted an allegation of "on or about," the 7 Court here accepts an allegation preceded by "on information or belief." Whether the evidence 8 does not support these allegations is not for the Court to determine now when it is merely weighing the adequacy of allegations. It is not implausible that Plaintiff did receive two calls 10 and he has done more than allege mere conclusions cast as factual allegations. 12 Conclusion 13 The Court DENIES AT&T's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to sustain his claim under the TCPA and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2). The allegations are not merely 14 conclusions of law casts as facts or mere labels. They are the Plaintiff's factual allegations based 15 on his best recollection, which is sufficient to permit the issue to proceed to discovery and trial, 16 17 where a fact finder may be able to weigh the evidence. 18 The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel. 19 Dated this 3rd day of February, 2012. 20 Marshy Helens Marsha J. Pechman United States District Judge 22 23 24

11

21